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Abstract
We empirically test whether the disposition effect, the inclination of investors to sell winning
stocks more readily than losing stocks, has an asymmetrical impact on the price adjustment on
the ex-dividend day. Using aggregate market data for a sample of ordinary taxable dividends
of common stocks listed in NYSE and AMEX during the 2001-2008 period, we employ the
capital gains overhang proxy to measure accrued gains or losses for individual stocks. We
find that stocks with accrued gains have a higher market adjusted price drop than stocks with
accrued losses on the ex-dividend day. Moreover, there is a significantly positive relationship
between the ex-day price drop and the capital gains overhang. Both results are attributed to
the disposition effect since active (limited) selling by holders of winning (losing) stocks will
most likely speed up (restrain) the downward price adjustment on the ex-dividend day. Our
results remain robust to various ex-day price drop measures and different investor holding
period lengths assumed.
Keywords: disposition effect, ex-dividend day, capital gains overhang
JEL classification: G12, G14, G35
31. Introduction
One of the most highlighted phenomena in trading behavior is the “disposition
effect”; when an investor faces the decision to select among candidate stocks to sell
off from his portfolio, he is more inclined to pick the ones with prior gains than those
with prior losses since their purchase. Various empirical studies have exploited
information from trade accounts of individual and professional investors to confirm
the existence of the disposition effect. In particular, they find that losing market
positions are held longer that winning positions, (Locke and Mann (2005), and Locke
and Onayev (2005)) and the proportion of accrued gains that are realized is greater
than the proportion of accrued losses that are realized in the average portfolio (Odean
(1998), and Barber et al. (2007)). In addition, attempts have been made to propose
possible causes of the disposition effect either from the perspective of a behavioral
bias resulting from prospect theory preferences (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)),
irrational investor beliefs (Odean (1998)), or as a natural implication of optimal
portfolio management (Lakonishok and Smidt (1986), and Harris (1988)).
Although most studies contribute as to whether and why the disposition effect exists,
few papers address the question of whether it actually has an effect on stock prices. In
Coval and Shumway' s (2005) words: “.....even if biases can be identified in investor
behavior, to demonstrate that this is more than just instances of noise trading,
empirical tests must be positioned to identify a link between biases in individual
trader behavior and overall prices. .....Namely, a key question raised is whether the
biases that are evident in trading behavior impacts prices”. Following Grinblatt and
Han (2005), and Frazzini (2006), we select a regular corporate event, namely, the
deprivation of the right to the dividend on the ex-dividend day to test whether the
disposition effect matters for asset pricing. Since the disposition effect refers to the
selling decision of investors, the natural downward price adjustment to the dividend
on the ex-dividend day renders it an accommodating setting to make accurate
predictions on the direction of a contingent mispricing caused by the disposition
effect. Furthermore, the lack of consensus as to what factors explain the cross-
sectional variation of the ex-dividend day anomaly apparent in the standard ex-day
literature, makes us suspect that the disposition effect could be one of them.
4In order to ascertain whether the disposition effect can affect stock prices at the ex-
dividend day, we opt for using market-wide daily stock data for two reasons. First,
data on daily portfolio holdings and trades of the universe of participants in wide
stock markets such as the NYSE and AMEX exchanges are not readily available.1
Second, since market prices reflect the trade decisions of both rational and
behaviorally biased investors, a possible divergence from fundamental prices induced
by the trades of disposition effect-investors might be arbitraged away quickly by their
rational counterparties. Whether arbitrage is effective in repressing any price
perturbation caused by the disposition effect can only be depicted in equilibrium
market prices. Of course, the use of market-wide data does not serve without a cost, as
it requires quite a few assumptions and approximations crucial for the empirical
analysis to be made. In particular, a proxy needs to be constructed from aggregate
data to measure the accrued gain or loss to the average investor owning a particular
stock at any time.2 We do acknowledge that this imperfect measure absorbs a lot of
noise unrelated to the testable hypotheses. However, we believe that this can only
make us more optimistic as to whether a significant relationship found in support of
our prediction is indeed truthful, as long as it proves to be robust. Jin (2006) consents
to this rationale by stating that “.....The error introduced by the imprecise
measurement of capital gains creates an attenuation bias toward 0 in the estimated
coefficient on the impact of capital gains. If we find evidence of price pressure due to
capital gains in the presence of the attenuation bias, the real magnitude of the price
pressure is likely to be more significant”.
In the empirical analysis that follows we use the “capital gains overhang” proxy, as
computed by Grinblatt and Han (2005), to measure the gain or loss accrued on the
aggregate investor holding a particular stock, and the price drop ratio proposed by the
ex-dividend day literature to measure the market-adjusted ex-day price adjustment. In
short, we test whether the magnitude of the expected price drop on the ex-dividend
day is conditional upon the prior positive or negative record of the stock price, as
1 There are few exceptions using comprehensive datasets of investor holdings and trades of all market
participants for a long period of time, such as Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), and Barber et al. (2007).
2 One of the most ambiguous inputs of the capital gain proxy measurement is the assumed average
investor horizon over which capital gains or losses accrue. Naturally, investors buy and sell stocks at
different times and therefore, for a given price stock appreciation, different amounts of gain will be
accrued to various investor holding durations.
5predicted by the disposition effect. We find that stocks that have appreciated in the
past have higher price drops on the ex-dividend day than stocks that have declined in
value, implying a positive relationship between the capital gains overhang and the ex-
dividend day price drop ratio that is found to be both statistically and economically
significant. The same conclusions are drawn when we substitute the ex-day abnormal
return for the price drop ratio, when we employ alternative methodologies for the
calculation of the ex-day normal return, when we use opening rather than closing ex-
day prices, and for different investor holding period lengths assumed. Our results are
in alignment with the disposition effect that postulates that the downward price
adjustment expected on the ex-day will be facilitated by willing sellers of winning
stocks while it will be hindered by reluctant sellers of losing stocks.
What is more, our results also contribute to the ex-dividend day literature, insofar as
they propose a new factor, namely, the past accrued gain or loss, to explain the cross-
sectional variation of the price drop on the ex-day. According to the “tax-dividend
clientele” theory, suggested by Elton and Gruber (1970, 1984), there must be a
positive relationship between the price drop ratio and the dividend yield of each stock
that ought to reflect the income tax bracket of the marginal investor at the stock's ex-
dividend day. In contrast, Kalay (1982, 1984) claims that, where the expected price
drop on the ex-day is large enough, effective short-term arbitrage around the ex-day,
will make the magnitude of the actual ex-day price drop be a function of the
transaction cost born by the short-term trader. In this study, we find a significantly
positive relationship between the ex-dividend day price drop ratio and the capital
gains overhang, after having controlled for both the dividend yield and the transaction
cost pertaining to each stock. We deduce that the capital gains overhang constitutes an
alternative factor with sufficient explanatory power over the cross-sectional variation
of the ex-day price reaction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the
literature on both the disposition effect and the ex-dividend day, ending with the
development of the hypotheses that will be empirically tested. Section 3 describes the
data selection and the filters applied as well as the methodology used to compute the
variables that are employed in the tests. Section 4 reports the empirical results that are
driven by the influence of the disposition effect on the stock price behavior on the ex-
6dividend day. With Section 5, this study is bridged with the ex-dividend day literature
and Section 6 concludes.
2. Review of the literature and development of the hypotheses
2.1. The disposition effect
The notion of the disposition effect was introduced by Shefrin and Statman (1985) as
the inclination of investors to “sell winners too early and ride losers too long”. Several
theories have been put forward to explain it; in short, within the behavioral context,
the disposition effect can be attributed either to prospect theory or to the regret versus
pride sentiment or to an irrational belief of mean reversion by investors. On the other
hand, those who posit rationality among investors state that the need for optimal
portfolio rebalancing and transaction cost minimization could lead to investor
decisions with the same characteristics as those of the disposition effect.
The most widely documented explanation of the disposition effect refers to investors
that are subject to mental accounting (Thaler (1985)) and the postulates of prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). According to this explanation, a great deal of
investors value equivalent - in terms of current fundamentals - stocks differently, on
the basis of their past accrued gain or loss that are “book-kept” in separate mental
accounts for each stock. Accrued gains or losses for a particular stock are evaluated
with respect to a reference price that can be proxied by the average cost basis of the
stock holdings. Prospect theory's assumed value function is S-shaped, implying that
investors are risk averse with respect to winning stocks but risk takers when it comes
to losing stocks. This automatically renders investors prone to selling past winners in
order to quickly cash-in their capital gains and holding losers with a low probability
of turning out to be profitable after all in the future. Moreover, the steeper convex
slope in the loss domain implies loss aversion that exacerbates their reluctance to
realize capital losses already accrued.3
3 In a recent paper, Barberis and Xiong (2009) run a simulation test on artificial stock trade data of
10,000 investors who are supposed to have prospect theory preferences and deduce that in certain
occasions, prospect theory fails to predict to disposition effect. Specifically, when the expected annual
stock return is high and the trading intervals within an one year horizon are few, the prospect theory
7Another purely psychological explanation of the disposition effect is the pursuit of
feeling pride by realizing gains and the avoidance of feeling regret by deferring losses
as noted in Shefrin and Statman (1985). Odean (1998) suggested that an irrational
mean reversion belief could serve as an alternative behavioral theory explanatory of
the disposition effect. He reasons that investors who fail to rationally update their
expected returns for the stocks that they own, might mistakenly believe that today's
losers will soon outperform today's winners. In particular, a holder of a stock that has
appreciated in the past might wrongly revise his expected return downward leading
him to a sell decision. Similarly, if the stock has depreciated in the past due to
negative information about its long-term prospects, the investor might insist on
keeping the stock within his portfolio because he fails to revise his expected return
downwards accordingly.
Other authors in the literature have also proposed rational interpretations of the
phenomenon of the disposition effect. Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) argue that the
disposition to sell winning stocks might be related to the rebalancing of portfolios
held by imperfectly diversified investors. As a stock that has consistently appreciated
in the past becomes over-weighted among overall stock holdings, investors will sell a
portion of it, in order to restore diversification to their portfolios. Also, a descriptive
comment made by Harris (1988) suggests that the reticence of investors to realize
losing stocks implied by the disposition effect can also be explained by the higher
transaction cost per dollar of investment implicit in low priced stocks that have been
performing badly in the market.
Since then introduction of the concept of the disposition effect by Shefrin and
Statman (1985), numerous researchers have provided support for the existence of such
an empirically observed phenomenon among both retail and professional investors.
For example, Odean (1998) analyzing the records of 10,000 trade accounts selected
from a US nationwide discount brokerage house, demonstrated that retail investors
have a strong preference for realizing winners rather than losers.4 Other studies that
value function predicts that investors will have a greater propensity to sell a stock with a prior loss than
one trading at a prior gain.
4 The author's results imply that the tendency to sell winners and hold losers is not motivated by either
the higher transaction cost of losing stocks or portfolio rebalancing. Also, he concludes that if there is a
mean reversion belief among investors, it is indeed irrational because portfolio profitability could have
8exploit trade records to demonstrate that retail investors are indeed subject to the
disposition effect while trading have been made by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) for
Finland, Shapira and Venezia (2001) for the Israeli market, Dhar and Zhu (2006) for
the US market, and Barber et al. (2007) for the Taiwan Stock Exchange. The validity
of the disposition effect has also been examined for professional trading such as by
Frino et al. (2004) for professional futures traders, Garvey and Murphy (2004) for
professional stock traders, Coval and Shumway (2005) for market makers in the
Treasury Bond futures contract at the Chicago Board of Trade, and Locke and Mann
(2005), and Locke and Onayev (2005) for floor traders in commodities traded on the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, among others. Overall, the authors conclude that
professional traders close their profitable positions at a much faster rate than their
losing ones, in support of the disposition effect.
2.2. Ex-dividend day
Miller and Modigliani (1961) propose that in an efficient market with no taxes and
transaction costs, at the ex-dividend day, the price of the stock should theoretically
drop by the exact amount of the cash dividend. Yet, empirical research has shown that
the price drops by less than the amount of the dividend. The “tax hypothesis”, the
“short term arbitrage and transaction cost hypothesis”, and mainly two market
microstructure hypotheses, the “tick size hypothesis” and the “bid-ask bounce
hypothesis”, all attempt to explain the empirical inefficiency of the price drop on the
ex-dividend day.5 Elton and Gruber (1970) first introduced the “tax hypothesis” that
posits that the drop in the stock price on the ex-dividend day is less than the amount
of the dividend when ordinary income tax rates imposed on dividends exceed capital
gains tax rates. In order for long-term investors to be indifferent between buying and
selling the stock before or on the ex-day, the equilibrium price drop on the ex-day
should reflect the net-of-tax value of the dividend that accounts for the difference
between income tax rates imposed on dividends and capital tax rates imposed on
been higher if investors refrained from hastening past gains realization and deferring past losses for too
long. Therefore, it is more likely that there are behavioral causes for the disposition effect.
5 Notably, attributing the abnormal ex-dividend day returns to the differential tax treatment of capital
gains and dividends is the most widely documented explanation in the literature.
9(long-term) capital gains. Given that dividends historically carried a tax disadvantage
relative to capital gains for individual investors, they should price the dividend at a
value that is less than the cash amount distributed by corporations and measured by
the price drop on the ex-dividend day. The argument of Elton and Gruber (1970)
implies that the effective tax rate on dividends for the marginal investor can be
inferred on the ex-day. Evidence supporting the “tax hypothesis” is provided by
several studies such as Poterba and Summers (1984), Barclay (1987), Robin (1991),
Lamdin and Hiemstra (1993), Lasfer (1995), Koski (1996), Green and Rydqvist
(1999), Bell and Jenkinson (2002), Graham et al. (2003), Elton et al. (2005), and
Milonas et al. (2006).
Alternatively, the “short-term arbitrage and transaction cost theory” is based on the
premise that marginal pricing on the ex-day is dominated by short-term arbitrageurs.
Kalay (1982, 1984) argues that, if transaction costs are negligible, risk neutral
arbitrageurs who have the same tax rate on short-term capital gains and dividends will
eliminate any abnormal returns on the ex-dividend day that are generated due to the
relative taxation of dividends. On the other hand, if transaction costs are non-zero, the
price drop should fall within the range of the amount of the dividend plus or minus the
transaction cost that is paid over a “round-trip” transaction. As a result, the
discrepancy between the ex-day price drop and the dividend will be just a reflection of
the transaction cost of arbitrage rather than the effective tax rate on dividends implied
for the marginal investor.
Within the microstructure explanatory framework, Bali and Hite (1998) argue that
whenever price discreteness (“tick size” hypothesis) entails dividends that are inexact
multiples of the tick size,6 the ex-day price drop will be equal to the dividend amount
rounded always downwards to the tick below. In addition, Frank and Jagannathan
(1998) presume that long-term investors who “find dividends more of a nuisance” due
to the cost of collecting and reinvesting dividends will want to either sell the dividend
on the day before the ex-day (cum-day) or buy (or repurchase) the dividend on the ex-
day. This “sell at cum-day versus buy at ex-day” order imbalance will be met by
market makers who will purchase the stock on the cum-day at the bid price and
6 Bali and Hite (1998) examine a period from July 2, 1962 until December 31, 1994 during which the
tick size was equal to 12.5 cents.
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subsequently sell it at the ask price on the ex-day. This trading behavior in the Hong
Kong stock market where neither dividends nor capital gains are taxed can explain a
price drop versus dividend discrepancy that is equal to the bid-ask bounce (“bid-ask
bounce hypothesis”). Both microstructure hypotheses directly challenge the “tax
hypothesis” as they have introduced explanations for the ex-day anomaly that are not
related to taxes.7
2.3. Hypotheses
Although there has been sufficient evidence of the prevalence of the disposition effect
in trading behavior, little empirical research has been done on its impact on asset
pricing.8 In this direction, Grinblatt and Han (2005) suggest that in a market where
rational investors co-exist with (PT/MA)9 investors who are prone to the disposition
effect, the equilibrium market price will be a weighted average of the fundamental
value and the aggregate cost basis - reference price for disposition effect investors. As
long as the absolute difference between the aggregate cost basis and the market price
(called “capital gains overhang”) is large, there will be underreaction to prior news
rendering past winners undervalued and past losers overvalued. However, as
disposition-free investors initiate trades to exploit the mispricing, the aggregate cost
basis for a stock is updated closer to the market price that is, in turn, closer to the
fundamental value. Thus, as gains and losses are realized via trading, the capital gains
overhang diminishes and the market price converges to the fundamental value. This
dynamic effect leads to momentum in stock returns and, hence, stock return
predictability.10 From a similar perspective, the impact of the disposition effect can be
effectively tested with market-wide data whenever we are aware that there will be a
significant price reaction at a particular date and an a priori prediction can be made
7 Nevertheless, Graham et al. (2003), and Jakob and Ma (2004) examine the effect of changes in price
quotation and find no support for the microstructure explanations.
8 Frazzini (2006), Grinblatt and Han (2005), and Coval and Shumway (2005) have directly addressed
this issue.
9 Grinblatt and Han (2005) presume that investors who are selling winning stocks faster than losing
stocks are governed by a prospect theory (PT) value function that is S-shaped and mental accounting
(MA) of accrued gains or losses.
10 Using Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions, the authors find a significantly positive cross-sectional
relation between a stock's capital gains overhang and its future stock return. They explicitly suggest
that the capital gains overhang that accounts for both past price direction and trading turnover is a
superior predictor of future returns than raw past returns.
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on the direction of the price change. If the disposition effect is prevalent among
investors, it will either accelerate or hinder the predicted price movement, depending
on its direction.
Corporate events constitute a plausible market setting to apply this principle. By
changing the fundamental value of the stock, corporate events often initiate investor
trading until the market price adjusts to the new perceived valuation. Whether the
disposition effect has a destabilizing character in restoring equilibrium prices remains
subject to empirical evidence. Within this rationale, Frazzini (2006) exploits corporate
earnings' announcements in order to test whether the disposition effect causes
underreaction of the stock price to the release of new information to the market. The
author claims that whenever positive earnings surprises occur for stocks with past
accrued gains, active selling by investors who are disposed to lock-in their capital
gains will create excess supply that leads to a lower price increase than expected on
the announcement day. Likewise, whenever negative earnings surprises take place for
stocks with past accrued losses, sluggish selling by investors who are reluctant to
realize their capital losses will reduce available supply that leads to a lower price
decrease than expected. The underreaction to either good or bad news on the earnings
announcement day will be corrected in the days following the news release,
generating the post-earnings announcement drift that has been widely reported in the
finance literature. The author concludes that the post-event drift is larger when news
and capital gains have the same sign and its magnitude is directly related to the
amount of unrealized gains (losses) experienced by the holders of the stock on the
announcement date.11
In the same vein with Frazzini (2006), we regard the ex-dividend day as an equivalent
opportunity to empirically test whether the disposition effect plays an important role
in asset pricing. On the ex-day the price change is foreordained; the stock price will
drop. In fact, apart from the direction of the price, we are also privy of the magnitude
11 Another study that examines whether the presence of accumulated capital gains can distort stock
prices around large earnings surprises using market-wide data is made by Jin (2006). He finds that
stocks that are mostly owned by institutional investors who care about the tax consequences of their
trades (the author names them “tax-sensitive”) and that have appreciated in the past, have a higher
cumulative abnormal return over a 3-day span around the earnings announcement. He states that tax-
sensitive investors, following an optimal tax strategy, postpone their sell trades with view to deferring
the realization of the accrued gains. As a result, as they limit their supply for the stock around negative
earnings surprises, an upward price pressure leads to inflated market prices.
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of the expected fundamental adjustment for it must approximate the relative value of
the dividend vis-à-vis capital gains. In addition, given that the ex-day constitutes an
informationless event, no conjectures need to be made on the interpretation of any
corporate signal by the market before predicting the impact of the disposition effect.12
If the disposition effect is pervasive in the investor trading behavior, we expect
holders of winning stocks to be more willing to sell than those of losing stocks on the
ex-day. Therefore, assuming a downward-sloping demand curve, two testable
predictions can be made with respect to the expected price impact of the disposition
effect on the ex-day:
Hypothesis I: Excess (limited) supply for winning (losing) stocks will result in wider
(smaller) price drops on the ex-dividend day.
Hypothesis II: The higher the unrealized gain (loss) accrued on the stock, the larger
(smaller) the ex-dividend day price drop, as the influence of the disposition effect on
trading activity will be amplified.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Sample construction and filtering
We start with the CRSP history of prices and dividends paid by stocks listed on
NYSE and AMEX from February 1, 2001 until December 31, 2008. This includes all
common stocks (CRSP codes: 10 and 11) that paid ordinary taxable cash dividends
throughout the period. The beginning of the examined period was carefully selected in
order to eliminate a possible tick size effect (Bali and Hite (1998)), and minimize any
bid-ask bounce effect (Frank and Jagannathan (1998)) or tax effect (Elton and Gruber
(1970)) induced by the relative taxation of dividends versus capital gains. From the
beginning of February 2001 both NYSE and AMEX were fully decimalized13 while
there has been just one main tax law amendment from early 2001 until late 2007, the
“2003 Jobs and Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act”. This Tax Act, effective in
12 We consider this point fairly important, as the disposition effect might be covered up by the price
impact of the divergence of opinions over the information that is conveyed in the market, as in the case
of corporate announcements.
13 Graham et al. (2003) show that bid-ask spreads and the quoted depth are significantly reduced due to
the increasing fineness of the pricing grid in the decimal era, starting on January 29, 2001.
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May 2003, equated the tax rate on qualified dividends to the long-term capital gain
tax rates which were reduced to 15%, at the medium and high income tax brackets.14
Our initial sample is comprised of 29,004 cash dividends that are fully taxable
throughout the years 2001-2008.15 Consistent with the prior ex-day literature, we
apply several screening filters to our sample in order to increase the power of our
tests. First, we exclude dividends going ex within 20 trading days after the previous
ex-day of the same stock. Second, we exclude dividends with an announcement day
within 4 trading days before their respective ex-day. Third, we exclude ex-days with
confounding corporate events. Specifically, if a stock split, stock dividend, rights
issue, bonus issue occurs within a [4, 4] window around the ex-day, then, the ex-
day is removed from the sample. Fourth, following Elton et al. (2005), we drop
“penny dividends” that pay less than $0.01 to investors. Fifth, we exclude dividends
of stocks that did not trade either on the cum-day or the ex-day. Sixth, we eliminate
dividends that pertain to stocks with a cum-price of less than $5 in order to reduce
extreme values and noise in the sample.16 Seventh, we omit ex-days whose estimation
period [(130, 31) & (31, 130)] has less than 60 observations.17 In total, we filter
out 1,967 ex-days (6.8% of the initial sample size of 29,004 ex-days) yielding a
number of 27,037 usable observations (100% of our “clean” sample), as illustrated in
Table 1.
Insert Table 1 here
3.2. Price drop ratio and abnormal return on the ex-day
We perform standard event-study methodology where various statistics are estimated
around the ex-dividend day. First, we calculate the Price Drop Ratio (PDRi) adjusted
14 The “2005 Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act” was effective on the 1st of January 2008
so that we expect this to have a minor influence on the eight year average relative valuation of the
dividend on the ex-day based on tax grounds. According to this Tax Act, qualified dividends remained
taxable at the long-term capital gain tax rates which were set to zero for income tax brackets less than
25%.
15 After having eliminated ex-days that have multiple ordinary cash dividends and/or a return-of-capital
distribution on the same date.
16 Elton et al. (2005) suggest that the bid-ask spread of low priced securities is sufficiently large relative
to the dividend that it can generate substantial noise in the empirical results.
17 We intentionally select an estimation period that contains trading days both before and after the ex-
day central time point in order to avoid a total overlap with the estimation horizon used for the
calculation of the capital gain overhang as described in section 3.5 below.
14
for the expected return on the ex-day that reflects the relative valuation of the
dividend by the marginal investor:
1
(1)
ex
cum i
i norm
i
i
i
PP
R
PDR
D
 
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 

where Picum is the closing price on the cum-day for stock i, Piex is the closing price on
the ex-day for stock i, Di is the amount of the dividend for stock i, and Rinorm is the ex-
day expected return that accounts for both the market return and the beta risk of stock
i as:
ˆˆ (2)norm mkti i iR R  
where αi and βi are estimated with the OLS market model over the estimation window
of [(130, 31) & (31, 130)] days, where day “0” is the ex-dividend day. As a
proxy for the market return (Rmkt) we use the percentage change of the daily value of
the CRSP equal weight NYSE/AMEX index on the ex-day.18 Second, we compute the
Abnormal Return (ARiex) that occurs on the ex-day, adjusted for the expected return:
(3)
ex cum
ex normi i i
i icum
i
P P DAR R
P
 
 
The ARex is an alternative measure of the ex-day anomaly that has a lower variance
and is less susceptible to the statistical problems of skewnness and kurtosis compared
to PDR, as will be shown below.
3.3. Outlier control and descriptive statistics
Price drop ratios can be relatively extreme for firms with negligible dividend payouts
and large price drops on the ex-dividend day or vice versa. Therefore, we trim the
upper and lower 2.5% quantile of our PDR sample in order to limit the outliers’
impact, following Graham et al. (2003). We also repeat the trimming separately for
the ARex total sample so that both PDR and ARex testable distributions move closer to
18 Elton and Gruber (1970, footnote 10) suggest that an equal weight index is preferable to a value
weight index for the calculation of the market movement on the ex-day.
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being normal.19 By excluding 1,351 outlier observations we end up with our final
sample of 25,686 ex-days that will be used for the analysis that follows. Table 2
reports descriptive statistics for PDR/ARex before and after trimming, therefore,
illustrating the marginal effect of outliers’ elimination. The elimination of extreme
outliers for the PDR sample has a tremendous normalizing effect as it reduces its
standard deviation from 10.24 to 4.15 (59%), skewness from 2.49 to 0.06 (102%)
and kurtosis from 168.65 to 5.65 (97%), in approximation.20 Likewise, for the ARex
sample, the 2.5% trim reduces the standard deviation from 1.96% to 1.32% (33%),
skewness from 1.39 to 0.14 (90%) and kurtosis from 63.15 to 3.33 (95%).
Furthermore, we confirm that for the 2.5% trimmed sample, the mean (median) PDR
is 0.741 (0.832), significantly less than the hypothesized value of unity and that the
mean (median) ARex is 0.124% (0.097%), significantly more than the hypothesized
value of zero (at the 1% level).
Insert Table 2 here
3.4. Abnormal turnover
There are few event studies that measure the abnormal volume activity on the ex-day
using the percentage deviation of the ex-day trade turnover from its mean turnover
calculated over the estimation window for an individual stock (raw ATO). As Ajinkya
and Jain (1989) document, this raw measure of abnormal trading volume for
individual securities is highly non-normal while a natural log-transformation yields
abnormal trading volume values that are approximately normally distributed,
depending on the sample size. Given the excessive skewness and kurtosis inherent in
raw ATO measures, we opt for a methodology that provides abnormal turnover
estimates deviating the least from normality, as follows. Initially, we calculate the
abnormal trading turnover on the ex-day of the PDR 2.5% trimmed sample using
three alternative metrics; i) raw ATO that assumes that the mean turnover over the
estimation period is representative of the normal stock turnover ii) natural log-
19 The PDR and ARex distributions do not share the same outliers. Performing separate trims on either
PDR or ARex contributes to the robustness of the regressions to follow where both are used as
dependent variables alternatively.
20 Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) explicitly point out the severe kurtosis that can be generated by
outliers in the PDR distribution and employ an averaging procedure to reduce the sensitivity of their
regression estimates to outliers.
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transformed ATO as described in Campbell and Wasley (1996), and iii) natural log-
transformed ATO as described in Lynch and Mendenhall (1997). Then, we compare
the three methodologies and select the one that better satisfies the normality
assumption.
According to Campbell and Wasley (1996), the abnormal trade turnover for stock i at
day t (ATOit) is calculated by:
 ˆˆ (4)it it i i mtATO TO TO   
where αi and βi coefficients are obtained via an ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression of TOit against TOmt throughout the estimation window of [(130, 31) &
(31, 130)] trade days.21 TOmt is the daily turnover for the market portfolio for a
given day t calculated as:
1
1 (5)
n
mt it
i
TO TO
n 
 
where n is the number of all NYSE/AMEX listed stocks contained in our sample at a
particular date t and TOit is the natural log-transformed daily turnover for individual
stock i as:22
ln 100* 0.000255 (6)itit
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where Vit and Nit are the trading volume in shares, and the number of outstanding
stocks, respectively, for a single security i at day t. On the other hand, the Lynch and
Mendenhall (1997) approach takes the ratio of the [log(1+$value of trading
21 Following Campbell and Wasley (1996), we also obtain the αi and βi coefficients using a two-step
estimated generalized least square procedure (EGLS) to control for possible autocorrelation present in
the parameter estimation. First, we run the usual OLS market model regression. The estimated OLS
residuals are then exploited to transform the original data and re-estimate αi and βi using the Yule-
Walker AR(1) correction. The EGLS procedure makes a minor difference to our analysis given that the
correlation between the OLS and the EGLS estimated ex-day ATO values is close to unity for the PDR
2.5% trimmed sample.
22 The ATO of Campbell and Wasley (1996) is similar to the one computed in the ex-day event study
of Kadapakkam (2000). Both papers use the logarithm of the stock turnover in order to remove the
pronounced skewness and use the market model in order to compute the normal turnover on the ex-day.
Their main difference is that while Kadapakkam (2000) adds a constant equal to 0.01, Campbell and
Wasley (1996) add a constant equal to 0.000255 to the logarithmic turnover, in order to preclude taking
the logarithm of zero trading volume on a given day.
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volume)/log(1+$value of outstanding stocks)] rather than the log of the ratio of
(trading volume/No of outstanding stocks) to calculate the daily stock turnover.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics and the χ2-statistic of the D’Agostino et al. (1990)
normality test for the distribution of the ex-day ATO computed with the three
alternative methodologies.
Insert Table 3 here
We observe that the percentage raw ATO has almost 90 times higher skewness
(16.35) and 50 times higher kurtosis (451.73) than the logarithmic ATO as per
Campbell and Wasley (1996) (skewness = 0.18 and kurtosis = 9.18). Likewise, it has
almost 7 times higher skewness and 29 times higher kurtosis than the logarithmic
ATO as per Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) (skewness = 2.41 and kurtosis = 17.61).
Given that the ATO of Campbell and Wasley (1996) yields the lowest positive
skewness, kurtosis and χ2-statistic compared to the other two alternatives, we find it
plausible to opt for the Campbell and Wasley (1996) methodology. Abnormal trading
turnover combined with abnormal return will be used in the examination of the
trading patterns before and after the ex-day as reported in the empirical results in
Section 4.4.
3.5. The capital gains overhang proxy
In order to test the disposition effect hypothesis on the ex-day, we need to use an
indicator that distinguishes among stocks with an accrued gain (winner) from stocks
with an accrued loss (loser) just before the ex-day. Aggregate accrued gains or losses
could be calculated with accuracy if we ideally knew the actual cost basis and holding
period of all investors holding an individual stock at each point in time. Provided that
we use market wide data as opposed to data extracted from trade records of all market
participants, it is not feasible to estimate either element with precision. We attempt to
tackle this by using the capital gains overhang that was introduced by Grinblatt and
Han (2005). This proxies for the market wide gain/loss accrued on a particular stock
using the time series of its past prices and the time series of concurrent and forward
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turnover values. In particular, for each ex-day t of stock i, we calculate the stock’s
aggregate cost basis on the cum-day (RPiT) using daily data as:23
 
1
1 1
1
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In essence, the aggregate cost basis is a turnover weighted average of past prices
where Pt-n is the stock price n days before the ex-day, TOt-n is the turnover n days
before the ex-day, and TOt-n+τ is the “forward-looking” turnover τ days after the t-n
day point, over an assumed holding period of T days.24 The inverse of the sum of
weights is a normalizing constant that makes all TO weights to past prices to sum to
one. This measure can be interpreted as follows. If a stock had a high TO value T
days before the ex-day but low TO during the trading days to follow, then we can
assume that most investors that hold the stock just before the ex-day use distant
purchase prices in their cost basis calculation. On the other hand, if TO were very low
at the beginning of the investors' holding period but very high towards the ex-day,
then, most likely, investors would use purchase prices proximate to the ex-day for
their accrued gain or loss computation. Thus, the capital gains overhang (hereafter,
“CGOH”) of stock i for an assumed investor holding period of T days can be
reasonably defined as the percentage deviation of the closing trade price from the
aggregate cost basis proxy on the cum-day:
*100% (8)
cum T
T i i
i cum
i
P RPCGOH
P


Given that it is impossible to infer the average holding period of all stock owners of a
particular stock with precision from market data, we test the validity of the
hypothesized relationship between the CGOH and the ex-day PDR/ARex using
alternatively seven different assumed holding periods in calendar time; T = 360, 250,
150, 90, 60, 30, 15 calendar days before the ex-day.
23 Grinblatt and Han (2005) consider this aggregate cost basis to proxy for the average reference price
adopted by all investors holding a stock, whose risk aversion against trades reflects an S-shaped value
function of accrued gains or losses that pertains to the inferences of prospect theory.
24 Following Grinblatt and Han (2005), we calculate turnover as the stock trading volume divided by
the number of outstanding shares.
19
Insert Table 4 here
Table 4 reports Pearson correlations for the CGOH calculated at seven different
calendar holding periods for the PDR 2.5% trimmed sample. We note that the
estimated correlations (ρ) are all significant at the 5% level and range from ρ (360,
250) = 0.98 for the longer horizons to ρ (360, 15) = 0.37 for those with the smallest
overlap. Although the empirical results that are presented in this paper are based on
the assumption of a 90-calendar days long holding period, all other six calendar
periods have also been used as a robustness test. Furthermore, Odean (1998) reports
that the median holding period for stocks held by his sample of US discount broker
investors is 84 trading days that approximates to 120 calendar days, not far from our
adopted 90-calendar day holding horizon assumption.25
4. Empirical results
4.1. Difference of means and capital gains overhang quantile analysis
In order to test Hypothesis I, we split the PDR/ARex 2.5% trimmed sample into losers
and winners on the basis of the CGOH estimated over the 90-calendar days holding
period and we calculate pooled arithmetic means and medians for each sample. In
approximation, 58% of the ex-days refer to stocks with positive CGOH (winners) and
42% of the ex-days refer to stocks with negative CGOH (losers).
Insert Table 5 here
Panel A of Table 5 shows that the mean PDR for winners is 0.887 (median = 0.928)
that is significantly higher than the mean PDR = 0.539 for losers (median = 0.684), at
the 1% level (t-statistic = 6.62). Similarly, the mean ARex for winners is 0.071%
(median = 0.046%) that is significantly lower than the mean ARex = 0.202% for losers
(median = 0.184%), at the 1% level (t-statistic = 7.70). The difference between
median values using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test remains statistically different from
25 In the case of quarterly dividends, the 90 calendar days horizon can be considered as non arbitrary if
we assume that all current owners of the stock decide to sell the stock around each quarterly ex-day.
Given that a significant number of investors sell or buy the stock around the ex-day because of
dividend capture or avoidance attitudes, it might be reasonable to assume that the aggregate cost basis
is widely updated every quarter.
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zero at the 1% level, providing strong evidence that the ex-day price drops more for
winners than for losers on a market-adjusted basis. Hypothesis II can be tested by
dividing each sample of losers and winners separately into three equally sized
CGOH90 quantiles and calculating mean (median) PDR/ARex values for each one of
the resulting six quantiles. In panel B of Table 5, we note that the mean (median) PDR
increases monotonically from 0.431 (0.639) in the quantile with the highest accrued
loss (14.7%) to 1.008 (1.022) in the quantile with the highest accrued gain (9.8%).
Similarly, in panel C of Table 5, the mean (median) ARex decreases monotonically
from 0.250% (0.234%) in the quantile with the lowest CGOH (13.5%) to 0.032%
(0.003%) in the quantile with the highest CGOH (9.8%). Notably, in the biggest
winner quantile, we cannot reject that the mean PDR is significantly different from
one (t-statistic = 0.13) and the mean ARex is only marginally significantly different
from zero at the 10% level (t-statistic = 1.65). As a robustness test, we replicated
Table 5 for all other six (T = 360, 250, 150, 60, 30, 15 calendar days) CGOH
estimation periods and we deduced that results remain qualitatively the same. In short,
we find that the higher the accrued gain on a stock before it goes ex, the higher
(lower) the PDR (ARex) will be on the ex-day, in alignment with Hypothesis II.
4.2. Regression analysis
Hypothesis II states that the higher the unrealized gain (loss), the larger (smaller) the
ex-dividend day price drop. This translates into an expected positive (negative)
relationship between the PDR (ARex) and the CGOH, for the whole sample, as well as
separately for winners or losers. Therefore, we regress the PDR/ARex of the 2.5%
trimmed samples against CGOH and a group of other explanatory variables that have
been consistently used in the ex-day literature in order to control for alternative tax,
transaction cost, short-term arbitrage and microstructure effects on the ex-day.
Accordingly, the pooled regression equation takes the form:
1 2 3 4 5 6/ 03
ex T
i i i i i i i i iPDR AR CGO DY MCap TO IVol Tax               
where CGOHiT is the capital gains overhang of stock i for an assumed investor
holding period of T = 90 calendar days. DYi is the stock dividend yield equal to the
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dividend amount over the closing price on the cum-day. MCapi is the mean stock
relative size equal to the natural logarithm of the ratio of individual stock
capitalization to market capitalization, averaged out over the estimation window of
[(130, 31) & (31, 130)] trade days. TOi is the average stock turnover over the
estimation window of [(130, 31) & (31, 130)] trade days.26 IVoli measures the
idiosyncratic volatility as the ratio of (individual stock standard deviation to market
standard deviation) of daily returns over the estimation window of [(130, 31) &
(31, 130)] trade days. Tax03i is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
ex-day is located after May 22, 2003 when the 2003 Tax Act was made effective, and
0 otherwise. We use the market capitalization and standard deviation of the returns of
the CRSP equal weight NYSE/AMEX index, that constitutes a proxy for the market
portfolio. The dividend yield has been consistently used in the ex-day literature as a
proxy for dividend-tax clienteles whereas the mean relative size, mean turnover and
idiosyncratic volatility should capture any liquidity, arbitrage and microstructure
effects.27 Michaely and Vila (1995) suggest that PDR volatility is a function of the
dividend yield and daily return volatility that could possibly generate severe
heteroscedasticity in the estimation. Therefore, the weighted least squares method
(WLS) is utilized for the PDR regression with the weight being equal to the squared
ratio of the dividend yield over the standard deviation of the stock returns over the
estimation period whereas the ordinary least squares (OLS) method is selected for the
ARex regression.28, 29
Insert Table 6 here
According to Table 6, for the sample including both winners and losers, the
relationship between the PDR and the accrued gain/loss measured by CGOH is
positive (coefficient = 1.803) whereas the relationship between the ARex and the
CGOH is negative (coefficient = 0.008). Both results are significant at a level much
less than 1% (t-statistic = 7.49 for PDR and t-statistic = 6.43 for ARex). The signs
remain the same when we repeat the PDR/ARex regressions separately for losers or
26 The daily turnover is computed by formula 7, section 3.4., as per Campbell and Wasley (1996).
27 Michaely and Vila (1995), Kadapakkam (2000) and Zhang et al. (2008) are a sample of ex-day
studies that employ some or all of these regressors.
28 Following Zhang et al. (2008).
29 The t-statistics of the estimated OLS coefficients are computed with heteroscedasticity consistent
standard errors, according to the White (1980) correction.
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winners, although significance is reduced to 1% for winners (t-statistic = 3.77 for
PDR and t-statistic = 3.11 for ARex) and to 5%-10% for losers (t-statistic = 2.55 for
PDR and t-statistic = 1.78 for ARex). The substantial reduction in significance that
occurs when the winners/losers are separately tested is somehow expected because the
differential price drop on the ex-day between stocks with a high past gain and a high
past loss due to the disposition effect, will be mostly evident when both are included
in the regression. Results also indicate that there is weak evidence on the importance
of alternative hypotheses on the ex-day. For example, the dividend yield remains
positively related with both PDR and ARex but only significant at the 5% level in the
all-stocks sample, and the 2003 Tax Act dummy variable is overall insignificant
across the six regressions. Larger and more liquid stocks appear to have lower
abnormal returns (higher price drops) that can be attributed to short term trading on
the ex-day but this result cannot be considered as strong as the positive (negative)
relationship between the PDR (ARex) and the CGOH.30 Overall, we find a significant
positive (negative) relationship between the PDR (ARex) and the CGOH, that is
especially pronounced when winning and losing stocks are tested together.31 The
effect of the capital gains overhang on the ex-day is also largely economically
significant. If a stock held by the aggregate investor has depreciated by 5% over the
assumed holding period of 90 days, its ARex will be higher by 0.041% (0.008 ×
5%), compared to a stock with no gain or loss accrued on the cum-day. This is quite
substantial if we take into account the fact that this extra return is one third of the
mean ARex (0.124%), for the 2.5% trimmed sample.
Next, we show that both a long array of robustness tests (section 4.3.), and empirical
testing of whether abnormal trading pressure around the ex-day can be charged for the
results presented so far (section 4.4.), corroborate our disposition effect-driven
hypotheses I & II.
30 For the all-stocks sample, the t-statistics for mean market capitalization and turnover are equal to
1.31 and 2.86, respectively, for the PDR regression, and equal to 4.17 and 3.11 for the ARex
regression.
31 As a robustness test, we repeat the PDR (WLS) and ARex (OLS) regressions using all other
alternative holding periods for the CGOH estimation; T = 360, 250, 150, 60, 30, 15 calendar days
before the ex-day. We find that the CGOH coefficient remains significant at the 1% level.
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4.3. Robustness tests
4.3.1. Opening prices
In frictionless markets, the price adjustment due to the dividend on the ex-day should
occur between the cum-day close and the ex-day open. Therefore, we repeat our
analysis after replacing the closing ex-day price with the opening ex-day price in
order to eliminate any noise associated with intra-day stock-specific volatility.
Furthermore, following Graham et al. (2003), we adjust PDR/ARex for the overnight
market movement, by assuming that the overnight normal return is one half of the full
ex-day normal return used previously.32 We replicate the tests on the difference of
mean and median PDR/ARex between winners/losers and the calculation of mean
PDR/ARex per CGOH quantile (as reported in Table 5 for closing prices), using the
alternative PDR/ARex computed with ex-day opening prices.33
Insert Table 7 here
Panel A of Table 7 shows that the mean PDR for winners is 0.836 (median = 0.860)
that is significantly higher than the mean PDR = 0.651 for losers (median = 0.690), at
the 1% level (t-statistic = 7.18 for the difference of means and z-statistic = 9.46 for
the difference of medians). Similarly, the mean ARex for winners is 0.104% (median =
0.075%) that is significantly lower than the mean ARex = 0.209% for losers (median =
0.179%), at the 1% level (t-statistic = 12.31 for the difference of means and z-statistic
= 12.25 for the difference of medians). Elton and Gruber (1970) and Elton et al.
(2005) refrain from using opening prices because all limit orders on the specialists'
books on the ex-day opening are adjusted by the full amount of the dividend. They
reason that this will render the mean absolute price drop from cum-day close to ex-
day open a biased (upwards) estimate of the equilibrium price drop. Nevertheless, if
we compare carefully panel A from Table 5 with panel A from Table 7 we can deduce
that the PDR/ARex values calculated with opening ex-day prices are very similar to
the ones calculated with closing ex-day prices if not lower. For example, the mean
32 We confirmed that using one third of the full ex-day normal return as an alternative overnight market
adjustment makes a minor difference to the reported results.
33 The 2.5% trimmed sample size falls from 25,686 to 25,628 observations because CRSP did not
provide opening prices for 58 ex-days despite the fact that there was positive trading volume on these
days.
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PDR calculated, for the all-stocks sample, with opening prices is equal to 0.759
(median = 0.798) that is very close to the mean PDR = 0.741 (median = 0.832)
calculated with closing prices. Moreover, the mean ARex calculated with opening
prices is equal to 0.147% (median = 0.114%) that is higher than the mean ARex =
0.124% (median = 0.097%) calculated with closing prices, hence, standing against
Elton and Gruber's (1970) prediction.
According to panel B of Table 7, the mean (median) PDR increases monotonically
from 0.508 (0.552) in the quantile with the most negative CGOH to 0.861 (0.909) in
the quantile with the most positive CGOH. Similarly, in panel C, the mean (median)
ARex decreases monotonically from 0.288% (0.289%) in the quantile with the highest
accrued loss to 0.085% (0.042%) in the quantile with the highest accrued gain. By
focusing our attention to the highest CGOH quantile, we observe that the mean PDR
calculated with closing prices, equal to 1.008 (panel B of Table 5), is higher than its
respective value calculated with opening prices that is equal to 0.861 (panel B of
Table 7). In non-tabulated results, we find that their difference is statistically
significant at the 5% level, using a two-tail test (t-statistic = 2.00). This is in
alignment with the disposition effect, since the investors holding the biggest winners
will get a chance to provide the full scope of their excess supply for the stock after the
ex-day's opening, resulting in a price drop slightly in excess of the dividend amount.
We repeat all regressions depicted in Table 6 with the alternative PDR/ARex measures
that are computed with opening ex-day prices and report our results in Table 8.
Insert Table 8 here
In the sample including both winners and losers, the coefficient of the CGOH is
positive (0.764) for the PDR regression and negative (0.007) for the ARex regression
both being significant at a level much less than 1% (t-statistic is equal to 6.51 for PDR
and 11.35 for ARex). When winners and losers are treated separately, significance
falls close to 1% except from the PDR regression for the stocks with accrued losses
where it is insignificant.34 Again, the significance on the coefficients of the control
34 As already discussed, this is expected because the variation of the price drop on the ex-day as a
function of the CGOH will be better identified when both winners and losers are included in the
regression.
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variables implies weak evidence for the power of the tax, transaction cost and
microstructure hypotheses to explain the dispersion of the PDR/ARex. The only
variable that remains significant at the 1% level across all six regressions is the mean
stock turnover but with the signs reversed compared to the regressions using closing
prices, implying that higher liquidity in fact, hinders the overnight price adjustment to
the dividend on the ex-day. Briefly, both hypotheses I & II are confirmed with both
closing and opening prices on the ex-day, hence, enhancing the support for the
predicted price impact of the disposition effect on the ex-day.
4.3.2. Alternative methodologies and capital gains overhang windows
With view to increasing the strength of our results we deploy a set of alternative
methodologies in the way we measure the expected return on the ex-day that adjusts
the PDR/ARex for the market movement.35 Specifically, we use i) the mean-adjusted
model where the average individual stock return over the estimation window is used
as the normal return on the ex-day, ii) the market-adjusted model where the return of
the CRSP equal weight NYSE/AMEX index on the ex-day is used as the normal
return, iii) the expected return based on the 3-factor Fama and French (1993) model,
and iv) the market model as described in Section 3.2 while adopting the CRSP value
weight NYSE/AMEX index as the market portfolio proxy. In addition, we repeat both
PDR and ARex regressions with OLS while adjusting t-statistics for ex-dividend day
clustering.36 At the same time, we employ all seven different assumed holding periods
for the CGOHT that are used alternatively; T = 360, 250, 150, 90, 60, 30, 15 calendar
days before the ex-day.37 Subsequently, we repeat the test of difference of mean and
median PDR/ARex between winners and losers (Hypothesis I, panel A of Table 5) and
the PDR/ARex regressions for the sample including ex-day stocks with both accrued
gains or losses, as described above (Hypothesis II, columns 2 and 5 of Table 6).38
35 Each PDR/ARex sample distribution that was derived with the alternative specifications, was
independently trimmed at the upper and lower 2.5 percentile.
36 Standard errors were adjusted for 1,943 clusters (ex-days), as per Williams (2000).
37 Naturally, if results prove to be robust across all seven different holding periods, we expect them to
remain qualitatively the same for every other single investor horizon between 360 and 15 calendar day,
before the ex-day.
38 Namely, using the WLS method for the PDR regression and the OLS method for the ARex regression
corrected for heteroscedasticity (White (1980)).
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In total, we performed 56 tests of difference of means and medians between winners
and losers (4 different normal return specifications × 7 CGOH holding periods × 2
measures (PDR/ARex) of the ex-day adjustment), and 70 regressions (56 regressions
as described above + cluster adjusted OLS regression for 7 CGOH holding periods ×
2 measures (PDR/ARex) of the ex-day adjustment). In unreported results, we find that
in 50 out of the 56 tests, the difference of mean and median PDR/ARex between
winners and losers was significant at the 1% level while only in 2 cases was it
insignificant at the 10% level, both pertaining to the 15-calendar day holding period.39
Similarly, out of the 70 regressions that were estimated, the beta coefficient on the
CGOH was significant at the 1% level in 68 estimations while it was significant at the
10% level for the remaining two cases (t-statistics range between 2.85 (1.92) and
8.91 (7.85) across all 70 PDR (ARex) estimated regressions). Overall, the results
remain robust to the various ex-day normal return specifications and different holding
period length assumptions employed.
4.4. Abnormal trading pressure around the ex-day
Graham and Kumar (2006) investigate the dividend preferences of retail investors by
inspecting the trading records of 77,995 US households taken from a major US
discount brokerage house. They find significant evidence of abnormal trading and
buy-sell order imbalances around ex-days driven by age and income investor
clienteles.40 Naranjo et al. (2000), claim that systematic dividend capture by
corporations that are taxed more heavily on capital gains than on dividends could
extend price drops so wide that ex-day abnormal returns turn out with a negative sign.
If sizeable dividend capture (avoidance) trades take place a few days before the ex-
day, they can generate significant upward (downward) pressure to the stock price until
the cum-day and perhaps a price reversal on the ex-day when initial buy (sell)
positions are closed. This consideration might raise doubts about whether our
39 Assuming a two-tail test on the difference of means.
40 Briefly, they find that old and low income investor aggressively buy the stock prior the ex-day in
order to capture the dividend while young investors prefer to wait until the ex-day before they buy the
stock, indicating a possible dividend aversion. Rantapuska (2008), examining the universe of trades in
the Finnish market over an 8 year period, also concludes that there is evident abnormal buying or
selling around the ex-day on the basis of the relative dividend taxation at the investor level.
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empirical results so far can be attributed to the disposition effect, given that these
results could simply constitute an artifact of upward or downward pressure by
dividend-induced trades. For example, stocks that are rising before the ex-day due to
abnormal buying by investors who pursue the right to the dividend are expected to
have a larger price drop as the prior upward pressure is reversed on the ex-day. In the
same manner, investors who dislike the dividend will hasten to sell the stock prior the
ex-day, hence, depreciating the stock until the cum-day and inducing a deflated price
drop on the ex-day. If the majority of stocks with a positive CGOH on the cum-day
exhibit excess short-term buying pressure and most stocks with a negative CGOH are
those subject to excess short-term selling pressure prior the ex-day, then, our
disposition effect explanation will merely “mask” the price impact of dividend-
motivated trades of particular tax, income or age clienteles. In theory, dividend
capture targeted to winning stocks can be justified in the following two ways. Investor
sentiment might make investors believe that stocks on an positive momentum might
quickly recover the price drop on the ex-dividend day. Also, already appreciated
stocks with deeply in-the-money call options are more likely to bear upward pressure
before the ex-day, as the call options are optimally exercised early by their holders
(Roll (1977), and Kalay and Subrahmanyam (1984)).41
In order to examine whether the above concern is valid or not, we use the cumulative
abnormal return over a window of 20 trading days ending on the cum-day to measure
significant abnormal buying (selling) pressure for stocks with prior longer term
accrued gains (losses). Using the ARex 2.5% trimmed sample of ex-days, we
separately split winning (losing) stocks with a positive (negative) CGOH90 into three
quantiles on the basis of the value of their [20, 1] cumulative abnormal return
(CAR[20, 1]). We consider those winners that belong to the top 3rd CAR[20, 1]
quantile as having abnormal buying pressure and those losers in the bottom 1st (most
negative) CAR[20, 1] quantile as having abnormal selling pressure, prior to the ex-
day.
41 As demonstrated by Roll (1977), and Kalay and Subrahmanyam (1984), the higher the underlying
stock price, namely, the more deeply in-the-money the call option, the larger the dividend amount, and
the shorter the duration until option maturity, the higher the probability of early exercise of American
call options before the ex-day.
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Insert Table 9 here
Table 9 reports the daily abnormal return (AR), cumulative abnormal return (CAR),
daily abnormal turnover (ATO) and cumulative abnormal turnover (CATO) for a
window of 20 trading day before or after the ex-day for the winner and loser quantiles
described above.42 According to panel A that refers to winners, both daily ARs and
ATOs in the [20, 1] trading day window are significantly positive at the 1% level.
CAR starts from 0.51% 20 days before the ex-day and rises to 11.02% on the cum-
day. Notably, CATO starts from 0.91% on day “20” and continuously increases until
the ex-day when it reaches an 146.72% value. After the ex-day, both AR and ATO
abruptly fall to lower levels than the ones prior the ex-day, although they remain
positive for another 10-15 days. We deduce that for this particular sample, there is
significant upward pressure prior the ex-day as indicated by both return and turnover
measures.43 Panel B illustrates an equivalent picture for losers. During the [20, 1]
trading day window daily ARs are significantly negative, and daily ATOs are
significantly positive within the [15, 1] trading day window, at the 1% level.
Particularly, CAR starts from 0.63% on day “20” and falls further to 12.18% on
the cum-day while CATO starts from 5.86%, 15 days before the ex-day and moves
upwards to 138.31% on the cum-day. After the ex-day, ARs remain negative but
insignificant at the 10% level (except from day “2”) whereas ATOs remain
significantly positive at the 1% level for another 10-15 days after the ex-day.44 Again,
we conclude that abnormal selling pressure prior to the ex-day is evident for this
group of losers.
In order to test whether short-term abnormal trading prior the ex-day is responsible
for the differential ARex between winning and losing stocks, we compare the ARex of
42 Abnormal return before or after the ex-day is calculated as the percentage deviation of daily closing
prices adjusted for the market movement using the market model estimated during the estimation
period. The abnormal return on the ex-day (ARex) includes the dividend, as illustrated in Section 3.2.
Abnormal turnover is calculated according to the Campbell and Wasley (1996) methodology described
in Section 3.4.
43 Most ex-day papers that seek to consider samples of stocks that are mostly subject to dividend
capture, select stocks belonging to the highest dividend yield quantile on the grounds that dividend
capturing trades will be more profitable when dividends are large in magnitude relative to the stock
price. Nevertheless, when we adopted this criteria we found weak evidence for abnormal trading
pressure prior the ex-day; the [20, 1] CAR was only 2.97% and the [20, 1] CATO was negative,
equal to 14.44%.
44 We confirmed similar abnormal return and turnover trends when we considered median rather than
mean values for the same analysis.
29
winning (losing) stocks that appear to have the highest upward (downward) pressure
with the ARex of those with the lowest upward (downward) pressure prior the ex-
day.45 In particular, we test the difference of the mean ARex between winners/losers in
the highest (3rd) CAR[20, 1] quantile and winners/losers in the lowest (1st) CAR[20, 1]
quantile. Were the short-term abnormal trading theory to be true, we should expect
the sample of winners with the highest prior upward pressure to have a lower mean
ARex than those with the lowest prior upward pressure. Likewise, the sample of losers
with the highest prior downward pressure should have a higher mean ARex than those
with the lowest prior downward pressure.
Insert Table 10 here
Table 10 reports two-tail tests of the difference of mean and median ARex between the
highest and lowest abnormal trading pressure quantiles separately for winners and
losers. We note that the mean ARex of the one third of winners with the highest
upward pressure prior the ex-day is 0.135% is significantly higher than the mean ARex
of the winners with the lowest upward pressure (0.002%), at the 1% level (t-statistic =
5.16). Moreover, the mean ARex of losers with the highest downward pressure
(0.181%) is lower but not significantly different to the mean ARex of losers with the
lowest downward pressure (0.231%), at the 10% level (t-statistic = 1.46). The same
conclusions are drawn when looking at the median values. Since the latter results do
not support the above mentioned predictions implied by the short-term abnormal
pressure theory, we cannot reject the argument that it is the investors' disposition
effect that drives the variability of the ex-day abnormal returns across stocks with
accrued gains or losses.46
45 In unreported results, we find that winners in the lowest CAR[20, 1] quantile have significantly
negative [20, 1] ARs and [20, 1] ATOs at the 1% level, confirming that no abnormal buying
occurs in this sample prior the ex-day. Similarly, losers in the highest CAR[20, 1] quantile have
significantly positive [20, 1] ARs and insignificant [20, 1] ATOs at the 10% level indicating that
no abnormal selling pressure is evident prior the ex-day.
46 As a robustness test, we repeat the analysis of this section using the CGOH estimated over 60 and 30
calendar days to distinguish between winners and losers and find the same qualitative results.
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5. Implications for the ex-dividend day literature
Although our motivation for this study stems from the need to identify whether
widely observed “taints” of trading behavior, such as the disposition effect, matter for
asset pricing, the empirical results presented here can also fill long-lived gaps evident
in the ex-dividend day research. Elton and Gruber (1970), Elton et al. (1984), and
Elton et al. (2005) who associate the ex-day price drop with the relative taxation of
dividends (“tax hypothesis”) make two solid statements. First, they argue that the
price drop on the ex-day is less than the dividend amount because capital gains tax
rates are less than ordinary income tax rates for the marginal investor. Second,
marginal income tax rates of different tax clienteles can be inferred by the cross
sectional variation of the price drop on the ex-day. In particular, they show that for
long-term investors to be indifferent between trading the stock before and trading the
stock after the opening of the ex-day, it must be that; PDR = (1-τd) / (1-τg) where τd is
the ordinary income tax rate applied to dividends and τg is the capital gains tax rate.47
As long as a particular shareholder group facing τd > τg is identified as the marginal
investor on the ex-day of a specific stock, the PDR for this stock will be < 1.
According to Elton and Gruber (1970), their results support the notion of dividend
clienteles; shareholders select stocks whose dividend policy is catering for the tax-
efficiency of their shareholdings. Namely, shareholders in high (low) income tax
brackets will seek to invest in stocks with low (high) dividend yields. As a result, the
magnitude of the ex-day price drop in a sample of dividends that implies the marginal
income tax status of each dividend clientele will be positively correlated to the stock
dividend yield.48 Subsequently, Kalay (1982, 1984) challenged the possibility of
47 Since the τg must be the effective capital gains tax rate that decreases with the amount of capital
losses accumulated, one might mechanically hasten to give a simple tax-based explanation of the
positive relationship between PDR and the capital gains overhang that is herein attributed to the
disposition effect, stated as: “The higher the accrued loss on a stock, the lower the τg in the
denominator of the formula, hence the lower the PDR-ratio”. We claim that such a surmise should be
taken with caution, given that the capital gains overhang that measures the accrued loss refers to a
single stock, while the effective τg in the PDR formula refers to the net capital gain of a portfolio of
stocks held by the taxable investor. What is more, if there are more than one investors sharing the stock
price setting on the ex-dividend day, the τg will reflect the average effective capital gain tax rate of
different investors with either winning or losing positions in the equities market. Therefore, we claim
that it is impossible to establish a valid direct link between the accrued gain/loss of an individual stock
and the investor-wide effective capital gains tax rate.
48 As reported in the PDR regression results in Table 6, the beta coefficient of the dividend yield is
positive (1.464) and statistically significant at the 5% level (t-statistic = 2.03) for the all stocks 2.5%
trimmed sample, in support of the dividend clientele theory. On the other hand, although one would
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inference of the investor tax-brackets from the ex-day price behavior. He stated that if
the transaction cost of round-trip trades is not substantial, short-term traders will
engage in arbitrage until the difference between the dividend and the ex-day price
drop equals the minimum transaction cost born for trading the stock (“short term
arbitrage and transaction cost hypothesis”). As a result, where the discrepancy
between the expected ex-day price drop and the dividend is snipped off due to
arbitrage, the PDR will merely reflect the actual level of transaction costs for which
profitable arbitrage opportunities are not feasible.
Both above mentioned theories compete to explain the cross-sectional dispersion of
the PDR in ex-dividend day samples; Elton and Gruber (1970) attribute the PDR
cross-sectional variation to the differing income tax brackets of various dividend
clienteles, while Kalay (1982) expects it to be a function of the liquidity, the bid-ask
spread and the risk involved in short-term trading around the ex-dividend days of the
sample. This paper contributes to the ex-dividend day literature by introducing the
disposition effect as another factor that makes PDR and ARex vary across stocks on
the basis of their accrued gain or loss. In particular, as postulated in hypothesis II and
supported by our empirical results, the higher the unrealized gain (loss) accrued on the
stock, the larger (smaller) the expected stock price drop on the ex-dividend day.
Graham et al. (2003) investigate whether any of the ex-day traditional hypotheses can
be reinforced by the results from analyzing the ex-day price and volume reactions to
the reduction in price discreteness and bid-ask spreads that occurred as the pricing
grid got finer until fully decimalized in NYSE from 1996 until 2001. Their results do
not support any of the microstructure predictions, notwithstanding, they are deemed
consistent with the tax explanation. However, their very last concluding remark is that
“..it is also possible that ex-day pricing patterns are caused by a phenomenon that has
not yet been identified in the financial economics literature”. We feel that our
empirical analysis constitutes one step forward in addressing the suggestion of this
statement.
expect the coefficient sign to turn negative in the ARex regression, it remains significantly positive
(coefficient = 0.022 with t-statistic = 2.34). We view this empirical finding as not in accord with the
dividend clientele argument.
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6. Conclusion
Since Shefrin and Statman (1985) introduced the notion of the disposition effect, there
has been a growing literature about whether and why the disposition effect is
prevalent on the trading behavior of both individual and professional investors.
However, little has been documented about whether it has a significant impact on
stock prices which is what matters most to the finance literature. Inspired from the
empirical study of Frazzini (2006), and Grinblatt and Han (2005), our paper adds to
the literature by examining the degree to which the tendency to sell winners more
readily than losers facilitates or hinders the downward price adjustment of the stock
price on the ex-dividend day. We use the capital gains overhang proxy, as computed
by Grinblatt and Han (2005), to measure the accrued gain or loss for individual stocks
just before the ex-day, based on market-wide data on stock prices and turnovers.
Consistent with the disposition effect, we find that stocks with a positive capital gains
overhang have a higher price drop than stocks with a negative capital gains overhang
on the ex-day. Moreover, the market adjusted price drop is positively related to the
level of the capital gains overhang. We attribute our results to the fact that active
(limited) selling by holders of winning (losing) stocks speeds up (restrains) the
downward price adjustment on the ex-day. Overall, our results remain robust to
numerous ex-day normal return specifications, different holding period length
assumptions and the use of opening prices in replacement of closing prices on the ex-
day. Lastly, we examine whether our empirical results are driven by evident buy-sell
order imbalances prior the ex-day that are unrelated to the disposition effect. We
deduce that abnormal buying (selling) pressure for winners (losers) prior the ex-day
affects ex-day abnormal returns in the opposite direction of what the disposition effect
predicts, hence, providing no support for an alternative hypothesis.
If there are traders with negligible transaction costs who simultaneously trade close to
the ex-day of high (positive) CGOH and low (negative) CGOH stocks with equal
dividend payments and market risk, might be able to extract stock-pair arbitrage
profits. Namely, they could short-sell stocks on the highest CGOH quantile and buy
stocks on the lowest CGOH quantile on the cum-day, and subsequently close these
positions on the ex-day. The equal dividends on these two roundtrip trades net out and
traders will only be taxed for their arbitrage capital gain. Hence, based on the median
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PDR values of Panel B in Table 5, they would gain $1.022 from the short position on
the average biggest winner and lose $0.639 from the long position on the average
biggest loser, for an assumed dividend payment of $1, resulting in a profit of $0.383
before taxes and transaction costs. In addition, they could minimize the overall market
risk exposure by executing these trades overnight, from cum-day close to ex-day open
and still earn a similar amount of arbitrage profit equal to $0.357, according to the
median PDR values of Panel B in Table 7 that uses ex-day opening prices.
Our results have implications for the ongoing discussion about whether behavioral
biases identified during trading are capable of influencing asset prices. We find that
one of the most widely acknowledged biases, namely, the disposition effect, can
create significant asymmetries in the valuation of common stocks on the ex-dividend
day.
34
References
Ajinkya, B.B., Jain, P.C., 1989. The behavior of daily stock market volume. Journal
of Accounting and Economics 11, 331–360.
Bali, R., Hite, G., 1998. Ex-dividend day stock price behavior: Price discreteness or
tax-induced clientele? Journal of Financial Economics 47, 127–159.
Barber, B.M., Lee, Y.T., Liu, Y.J., Odean, T., 2007. Is the aggregate investor
reluctant to realise losses? Evidence from Taiwan. European Financial Management
13, 423–447.
Barberis, N., Xiong, W., 2009. What drives the disposition effect? An analysis of a
long-standing preference-based explanation. Journal of Finance 64, 751–884.
Barclay, M.J., 1987. Dividends, taxes, and common stock prices. The ex-dividend day
behavior of common stock prices before the income tax. Journal of Financial
Economics 19, 31–44.
Bell, L., Jenkinson, T., 2002. New evidence of the impact of dividend taxation and on
the identity of the marginal investor. Journal of Finance 57, 1321–1345.
Boyd, J., Jagannathan, R., 1994. Ex-dividend price behavior of common stocks.
Review of Financial Studies 7, 711–741.
Campbell, C.J., Wasley, C.E., 1996. Measuring abnormal daily trading volume for
samples of NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ securities using parametric and nonparametric
test statistics. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 6, 309–326.
Coval, J.D., Shumway, T., 2005. Do behavioral biases affect prices? Journal of
Finance 60, 1–34.
D’Agostino, R.B., Belanger, A.J., D’Agostino, R.B.Jr., 1990. A suggestion for using
powerful and informative tests of normality. American Statistician 44, 316–321.
Dhar, R., Zhu, N., 2006. Up close and personal: Investor sophistication and the
disposition effect. Management Science 52, 726–740.
Elton, E.J., Gruber, M.J., 1970. Marginal stockholders’ tax rates and the clientele
effect. Review of Economics and Statistics 52, 68–74.
Elton, E.J., Gruber, M.J., Blake, C.R., 2005. Marginal stockholder tax effects and ex-
dividend-day price behavior: Evidence from taxable versus nontaxable closed-end
funds. Review of Economics and Statistics 87, 579–586.
Elton, E.J., Gruber, M.J., Rentzler, J., 1984. The ex-dividend day behavior of stock
prices: A re-examination of the clientele effect: A comment. Journal of Finance 39,
551–556.
35
Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and
bonds. Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3–56.
Fama, E.F., MacBeth, J.D., 1973. Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests.
Journal of Political Economy 81, 607–636.
Frank, M., Jagannathan, R., 1998. Why do stock prices drop by less than the value of
the dividend? Evidence from a country without taxes. Journal of Financial Economics
47, 161–188.
Frazzini, A., 2006. The disposition effect and underreaction to news. Journal of
Finance 61, 2017–2046.
Frino, A., Johnstone, D., Zheng, H., 2004. The propensity for local traders in futures
markets to ride losses: Evidence of irrational or rational behavior? Journal of Banking
and Finance 28, 353–372.
Garvey, R., Murphy, A., 2004. Are professional traders too slow to realize their
losses? Financial Analysts Journal 60, 35–43.
Graham, J.R., Kumar, A., 2006. Do dividend clienteles exist? Evidence on dividend
preferences of retail investors. Journal of Finance 61, 1305–1336.
Graham, J.R., Michaely, R., Roberts, M.R., 2003. Do price discreteness and
transaction costs affect stock returns? Comparing ex-dividend pricing before and after
decimalization. Journal of Finance 58, 2611–2635.
Green, R.C., Rydqvist, K., 1999. Ex-day behavior with dividend preference and
limitations to short-term arbitrage: The case of Swedish lottery bonds. Journal of
Financial Economics 53, 145–187.
Grinblatt, M., Han, B., 2005. Prospect theory, mental accounting and momentum.
Journal of Financial Economics 78, 311–339.
Grinblatt, M., Keloharju, M., 2001. What makes investors trade? Journal of Finance
56, 589–616.
Harris, L., 1988. Predicting contemporary volume with historic volume at differential
price levels: Evidence supporting the disposition effect: Discussion. Journal of
Finance 43, 698–699.
Jakob, K., Ma, T., 2004. Tick size, NYSE rule 118, and ex-dividend day stock price
behavior. Journal of Financial Economics 72, 605–625.
Jin, L., 2006. Capital gains tax overhang and price pressure. Journal of Finance 61,
1399–1431.
36
Kadapakkam, R.P., 2000. Reduction of constraints on arbitrage trading and market
efficieny: An examination of ex-day returns in Hong Kong after introduction of
electronic settlement. Journal of Finance 55, 2841–2861.
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under
risk. Econometrica 47, 263–291.
Kalay, A., 1982. The ex-dividend day behavior of stock prices: A re-examination of
the clientele effect. Journal of Finance 37, 1059–1070.
Kalay, A., 1984. The ex-dividend day behavior of stock prices: A re-examination of
the clientele effect: A reply. Journal of Finance 39, 557–561.
Kalay, A., Subrahmanyam, M.G., 1984. The ex-dividend day behavior of option
prices. Journal of Business 57, 113–128.
Koski, J.L., 1996. A microstructure analysis of ex-dividend stock price behavior
before and after the 1984 and 1986 tax reform acts. Journal of Business 69, 313–338.
Lakonishok, J., Smidt, S., 1986. Volume for winners and losers: Taxation and other
motives for stock trading. Journal of Finance 41, 951–974.
Lamdin, D.J., Hiemstra, C., 1993. Ex–dividend day share price behavior: Effects of
the Tax reform Act of 1986. Review of Economics and Statistics 75, 778–783.
Lasfer, M.A., 1995. Ex–day behavior–tax or short–term trading effects. Journal of
Finance 50, 875–897.
Locke, P.R., Mann, S.C., 2005. Professional trader discipline and trade disposition.
Journal of Financial Economics 76, 401–444.
Locke, P.R., Onayev, Z., 2005. Trade duration: Information and trade disposition.
Financial Review 40, 113–129.
Lynch, A.W., Mendenhall, R.R., 1997. New Evidence on stock price effects
associated with changes in the S&P 500 Index. Journal of Business 70, 351–383.
Michaely, R., Vila, J-L., 1995. Investors’ heterogeneity, prices, and volume around
the ex-dividend day. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 30, 171–198.
Miller, M., Modigliani, F., 1961. Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of
shares. Journal of Business 34, 411–433.
Milonas, T.N., Travlos, G.N., Xiao, Z.J., Tan, C., 2006. The ex-dividend day stock
price behavior in the Chinese stock market. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 14,
155–174.
37
Naranjo, A., Nimalendran, M., Ryngaert, M., 2000. Time variation of ex-dividend day
stock returns and corporate dividend capture: A reexamination. Journal of Finance 55,
2357–2372.
Odean, T., 1998. Are investors reluctant to realize losses? Journal of Finance 53,
1775–1797.
Porterba, J., Summers, L., 1984. New evidence that taxes affect the valuation of
dividends. Journal of Finance 39, 1397–1415.
Rantapuska, E., 2008. Ex-dividend day trading: Who, how, and why? Evidence from
the Finnish market. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 355–374.
Robin, A.J., 1991. The impact of the 1986 tax reform act on ex-dividend day returns.
Financial Management 20, 60–70.
Roll, R., 1997. An analytic valuation formula for unprotected American call options
on stocks with known dividends. Journal of Financial Economics 5, 251–258.
Shapira, Z., Venezia, I., 2001. Patterns of behavior of professionally managed and
independent investors. Journal of Banking and Finance 25, 1573–1587.
Shefrin, H., Statman, M., 1985. The disposition to sell winners too early and ride
losers too long: Theory and evidence. Journal of Finance 40, 777–790.
Thaler, R., 1985. Mental accounting and consumer choice. Marketing Science 4,
199–214.
Williams, R.L., 2000. A note on robust variance estimation for cluster-correlated data.
Biometrics 56, 645–646.
White, H., 1980. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a
direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48, 817–838.
Zhang, Y., Farrell, K.A., Brown, T.A., 2008. Ex-dividend day price and volume: The
case of 2003 dividend tax cut. National Tax Journal 61, 105–125.
38
Table 1
Filters of sample screening NYSE and AMEX ex-days of ordinary cash dividends
of common stocks for years 2001-2008.
The initial sample consists of the entire CRSP history of ordinary cash dividends paid by common
stocks listed on NYSE and AMEX from February 1, 2001 until December 31, 2008. The initial sample
size (29,004 obs.) is reduced by the removal of dividends going ex within 20 trading days after the
previous ex-day of the same stock, dividends with an announcement day within 4 trading days before
their respective ex-day, ex-days with confounding corporate events (stock split, stock dividend, rights
issue, bonus issue) within a [4, 4] window around the ex-day, “penny dividends” < $0.01, dividends
whose stocks did not trade either on the ex-day or the cum-day, dividends whose stocks are priced at
less than $5 on the cum-day, and finally, those dividends whose stocks were thinly traded over the
estimation period [(130, 31) & (31, 130)]. The third column counts removed observations as a
percentage of the initial sample size (29,004 obs.). In addition, in order to mitigate the outlier impact
we trim separately the PDR and the ARex total distributions at the 2.5% upper and 2.5% lower tail.
Filters and Trimming applied to the ex-day sample (2001-2008) Removed
Obs
Removed
%
Residual
Obs
Ex-days for all ordinary cash dividends (2001-2008). 29,004
Exclude dividends going ex within 20 trading days after the
previous ex-day of the same stock.
61 0.2% 28,943
Exclude dividends with an announcement day within 4 trading days
before their respective ex-day [4, 1].
394 1.4% 28,549
Exclude dividends with a corporate event within 4 trading days
before or after their respective ex-day [4, +4].
167 0.6% 28,382
Exclude all “penny dividends” < $0.01. 295 1.0% 28,087
Exclude ex-days with no trade on either the ex-day or the cum-day. 745 2.6% 27,342
Exclude ex-days with stock price < $5.0 on the cum-day. 302 1.0% 27,040
Exclude ex-days whose estimation period [(130, 31) & (+31,
+130)] has less than 60 observations.
3 0.0% 27,037
Trim the 2.5% upper tail and 2.5% lower tail of the ex-day Price
Drop ratio/Abnormal Return distribution of the total sample.
1,351 25,686
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics of the price drop ratio (PDR) and abnormal return (ARex)
on the ex-day, for the entire sample and the 2.5% trimmed sample.
This table presents summary statistics for the price drop ratio (PDR) and the abnormal return (ARex) on
the ex-day, as well as t-tests on the theoretical values for PDR =1 and ARex =0. The second and fourth
columns show statistics for the PDR and the ARex respectively, for the entire sample (100%). The third
and fifth columns show statistics for the PDR and the ARex respectively, after trimming the top and
bottom 2.5 percentiles (95%) separately for each measure. The PDR is defined as [(Pcum  (Pex/(1 +
Rnorm))) / Div] and the ARex is defined as [((Pex  Pcum  Div) / Pcum)  Rnorm]. Pcum is the closing price
on the cum-dividend day, Pex is the closing price on the ex-dividend day adjusted for market risk
(Rnorm) on that day and Div is the dividend amount. Rnorm is the expected return on the ex-day
calculated using the market model that is estimated over the [(130, 31) & (31, 130)] days window
around the ex-day with the CRSP equal weight NYSE/AMEX index as the market proxy. The
Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used for testing median values. *** denotes statistical significance at the
1% level, using a two-tailed test.
Variable PDR (Ho: PDR=1) ARex (Ho: ARex=0)
Distribution 100% 95% 100% 95%
Obs 27,037 25,686 27,037 25,686
Mean 0.783*** 0.741*** 0.134%*** 0.124%***
Std Error 0.062 0.026 0.012% 0.008%
t-stat -3.48 -9.97 11.25 15.13
Median 0.832*** 0.832*** 0.097%*** 0.097%***
z-stat -10.95 -11.84 12.78 13.72
Std. Dev. 10.244 4.154 1.955% 1.318%
Variance 104.939 17.260 0.038% 0.017%
Min -277.107 -14.890 -33.670% -3.529%
Max 373.260 16.834 63.547% 4.041%
Skewness 2.492 -0.063 1.388 0.137
Kurtosis 168.648 5.648 63.145 3.329
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics for the abnormal turnover (ATO) on the ex-day
for the PDR sample.
This table reports descriptive statistics for the abnormal turnover (ATO) on the ex-day for the PDR
sample after trimming the top and bottom 2.5 percentiles, using three alternative methodologies. The
second column reports the raw percentage ATO that is computed as the percentage deviation of stock
turnover (TO) on the ex-day from the stock mean TO over the estimation window of [(130, 31) &
(31, 130)] days around the ex-day where TO is defined as the simple ratio of (trading volume/No of
outstanding stocks). The third column reports the log-transformed ATO as described in Campbell and
Wasley (1996) who measure TO as the natural log of (the ratio of (100 × (trading volume/No of
outstanding stocks)) + 0.000255) and ATO as the TO on the ex-day in excess of the normal stock TO
estimated using the market model (OLS) over the estimation window of [(130, 31) & (31, +130)]
days around the ex-day. The fourth column reports the natural log-transformed ATO as described in
Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) who measure TO as the ratio of the [ln(1$value of trading
volume)/ln(1+$value of outstanding stocks)] and ATO as the TO on the ex-day in excess of the normal
stock TO estimated using the market model (OLS) over the estimation window of [(130, 31) & (31,
130)] days around the ex-day. The market portfolio is defined as all NYSE/AMEX listed stocks
contained in our sample at a particular date. The last row provides the χ² statistic of the D’Agostino et
al. (1990) test that tests the null hypothesis of assumed normality based on the levels of skewness and
kurtosis, in combination. *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Abnormal Turnover on the ex-day (ATO)
Cambell and Lynch and
Methodology Raw % Wasley (96) Mendenhall (97)
Obs 25,686 25,686 25,686
Mean 0.1082 0.0189 0.0067
Median -0.1265 -0.0053 0.0012
Std. Dev. 1.4897 0.6311 0.0436
Min -0.9945 -4.5875 -0.2773
Max 64.2393 4.8286 0.5488
Skewness 16.353 0.183 2.408
Kurtosis 451.727 9.180 17.611
Normality (χ²) 51,524*** 3,436*** 14,718***
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Table 4
Pearson correlations between various time horizons of the Capital Gains
Overhang (CGOH) for the PDR sample.
This table reports pairwise Pearson correlations for the capital gains overhang (CGOH) calculated at
seven different calendar holding periods for the PDR sample after trimming the top and bottom 2.5
percentiles; T = 360, 250, 150, 90, 60, 30, 15 calendar days before the ex-day. The CGOH is defined as
the percentage deviation of the closing trade price on the cum-day from the aggregate cost basis proxy,
that is computed as in Grinblatt and Han (2005) using daily price and turnover data:
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Pt-n is the stock price n days before the ex-day, TOt-n is the turnover n days before the ex-day and
TOt-n+τ is the “forward-looking” TO τ days after the t-n day point. The inverse of the sum of weights is
a normalizing constant that makes all TO weights to past prices to sum to one. ** denotes significance
at the 5% level.
T period 360 250 150 90 60 30 15
360 1
250 0.982** 1
150 0.918** 0.963** 1
90 0.823** 0.875** 0.951** 1
60 0.719** 0.771** 0.859** 0.954** 1
30 0.526** 0.570** 0.654** 0.765** 0.876** 1
15 0.374** 0.407** 0.470** 0.560** 0.669** 0.867** 1
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Table 5
Difference of mean and median PDR/ARex between losers and winners
and PDR/ARex per CGOH quantile.
Panel A tests the significance of the difference of the mean and median PDR/ARex between stocks with
a negative CGOH (losers) and stocks with a positive CGOH (winners). Panels B and C report the mean
and median PDR/ARex per six CGOH quantiles as well as t-statistics from testing whether the two ex-
day measures are equal to their hypothesized values (PDR=1 or ARex=0). Means and medians have
been calculated after trimming the top and bottom 2.5 percentiles separately for the PDR/ARex samples.
The PDR is defined as [(Pcum  (Pex/(1 + Rnorm))) / Div] and the ARex is defined as [((Pex  Pcum  Div) /
Pcum)  Rnorm]. Pcum is the closing price on the cum-dividend day, Pex is the closing price on the ex-
dividend day adjusted for market risk (Rnorm) on that day and Div is the dividend amount. Rnorm is the
expected return on the ex-day calculated using the market model that is estimated over the [(130, 31)
& (31, 130)] days window around the ex-day with the CRSP equal weight NYSE/AMEX index as
the market proxy. The CGOH is defined as the percentage deviation of the closing trade price on the
cum-day from the aggregate cost basis proxy over an assumed holding period of 90 calendar days that
is computed as in Grinblatt and Han (2005) using daily price and turnover data, and described in
Section 3.5. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used for testing the difference of median values. ***, **,
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Difference of mean and median PDR/ARex between losers and winners
PDR ARex
Status (CGOH90) Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median
Losers 10,752 0.539 0.684 10,570 0.202% 0.184%
Winners 14,934 0.887 0.928 15,116 0.071% 0.046%
Diff. -0.348*** -0.244*** 0.131%*** 0.138%***
t-stat / z-stat -6.62 -8.09 7.70 8.19
Total 25,686 0.741 0.832 25,686 0.124% 0.097%
Panel B: PDR per CGOH90 Quantile
Losers Winners
Quantile 3 2 1 1 2 3
CGOH90 -14.7% -4.4% -1.2% 1.5% 4.5% 9.8% Total
Median 0.639 0.709 0.702 0.880 0.918 1.022 0.832
Mean 0.431*** 0.584*** 0.602*** 0.775*** 0.878** 1.008 0.741***
t-stat
(PDR=1)
-7.34 -6.08 -6.35 -4.26 -2.22 0.13 -9.97
Obs 3,584 3,584 3,584 4,978 4,978 4,978 25,686
Panel C: ARex per CGOH90 Quantile
Losers Winners
Quantile 3 2 1 1 2 3
CGOH90 -13.5% -4.3% -1.2% 1.5% 4.6% 9.8% Total
Median 0.234% 0.166% 0.157% 0.072% 0.056% 0.003% 0.097%
Mean 0.250%*** 0.188%*** 0.166%*** 0.105%*** 0.074%*** 0.032%* 0.124%***
t-stat
(ARex=0)
9.17 8.35 8.20 6.26 4.42 1.65 15.13
Obs 3,523 3,523 3,524 5,039 5,039 5,038 25,686
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Table 6
Relationship between PDR/ARex and CGOH for the whole sample and separately
for winners or losers.
This table reports the estimated coefficients and their t-statistics of the pooled regressions of PDR/ARex
of the 2.5% trimmed samples against CGOH and a group of control variables as:
PDRi / ARiex = α + β1CGOHi + β2DYi + β3MCapi + β4TOi + β5IVoli + β5Tax03i + εi
where CGOHi is the capital gains overhang of stock i for an assumed investor holding period of 90
calendar days. DYi is the dividend yield equal to the dividend amount over the closing price on the
cum-day. MCapi is the mean stock relative size equal to the average natural log (individual stock
capitalization to market capitalization) over the estimation window. TOi is the average stock turnover
over the estimation window. IVoli measures the idiosyncratic volatility as the ratio of (individual stock
standard deviation to market standard deviation) of daily returns over the estimation window. Tax03i is
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ex-day is located after the May 22, 2003 Tax Act and
0 otherwise. The weighted least squares method (WLS) is utilized for the PDR regression with the
weight being equal to the squared ratio of (DY to stock return standard deviation over the estimation
window). The ARex regression estimated with the ordinary least squares (OLS) method reports t-
statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity (White (1980)). Both PDR and ARex are computed as
described in Section 3.2 using closing prices on the ex-day. The estimation window is [(130, 31) &
(+31, +130)] trade days around the ex-day and the CRSP equal weight NYSE/AMEX index is
employed as a proxy for the market portfolio. The CGOH is defined as the percentage deviation of the
closing trade price on the cum-day from the aggregate cost basis proxy over an assumed holding period
of 90 calendar days that is computed as in Grinblatt and Han (2005) using daily price and turnover
data, and described in Section 3.5. The number in parentheses below the coefficient is the t-statistic.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
PDR (WLS) ARex (OLS)
Var./Sample All stocks Winners Losers All stocks Winners Losers
Intercept 1.1558*** 1.4277*** 0.7530*** -0.0016*** -0.0028*** 0.0002
(10.34) (9.74) (4.33) (-3.35) (-4.64) (0.28)
CGOH90 1.8029*** 2.7793*** 0.9355** -0.0083*** -0.0095*** -0.0042*
(7.49) (3.77) (2.55) (-6.43) (-3.11) (-1.78)
DY 1.4637** 1.0858 1.7502* 0.0217** 0.0191 0.0243*
(2.03) (0.98) (1.82) (2.34) (1.45) (1.91)
Mcap 0.0169 0.0361** -0.0011 -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0001
(1.31) (2.14) (-0.05) (-4.17) (-4.52) (-1.55)
TO 0.0789*** 0.0967*** 0.0401 -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0002
(2.86) (2.65) (0.94) (-3.11) (-2.73) (-1.33)
IVol -0.0668*** -0.0810** -0.0639* 0.0002* 0.0003* 0.0001
(-2.85) (-2.51) (-1.79) (1.65) (1.86) (0.59)
Tax03 -0.0256 -0.1143** 0.1051 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0003
(-0.53) (-1.83) (1.35) (0.07) (1.01) (-1.05)
Adj. R2 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.002
F-stat 13.56 6.62 2.93 17.44 10.74 3.17
Obs 25,686 14,934 10,752 25,686 15,116 10,570
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Table 7
Difference of mean and median PDR/ARex between losers and winners
and PDR/ARex per CGOH quantile, using opening prices on the ex-day.
Both PDR and ARex are computed as described in Graham et al. (2003) using opening prices on the ex-
day. Panel A tests the significance of the difference of the mean and median PDR/ARex between stocks
with a negative CGOH (losers) and stocks with a positive CGOH (winners). Panels B and C report the
mean and median PDR/ARex per six CGOH quantiles as well as t-statistics from testing whether the
two ex-day measures are equal to their hypothesized values (PDR=1 or ARex=0). Means and medians
have been calculated after trimming the top and bottom 2.5 percentiles separately for the PDR/ARex
samples. The PDR is defined as [(Pcum  (Pex/(1 + Rnorm))) / Div] and the ARex is defined as [((Pex  Pcum
 Div) / Pcum)  Rnorm]. Pcum is the closing price on the cum-dividend day, Pex is the closing price on the
ex-dividend day adjusted for market risk (Rnorm) on that day and Div is the dividend amount. Rnorm is
the expected return on the ex-day calculated using the market model that is estimated over the [(130,
31) & (31, 130)] days window around the ex-day with the CRSP equal weight NYSE/AMEX index
as the market proxy. The CGOH is defined as the percentage deviation of the closing trade price on the
cum-day from the aggregate cost basis proxy over an assumed holding period of 90 calendar days that
is computed as in Grinblatt and Han (2005) using daily price and turnover data, and described in
Section 3.5. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used for testing the difference of median values. ***, **,
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Ex-day opening prices; difference of mean and median PDR/ARex between losers and winners
PDR ARex
Status
(CGOH90)
Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median
Losers 10,702 0.651 0.690 10,501 0.209% 0.179%
Winners 14,926 0.836 0.860 15,127 0.104% 0.075%
Diff. -0.184*** -0.170*** 0.105%*** 0.104%***
t-stat / z-stat -7.18 -9.46 12.31 12.25
Total 25,628 0.759 0.798 25,628 0.147% 0.114%
Panel B: Ex-day opening prices; PDR per CGOH90 Quantile
Losers Winners
Quantile 3 2 1 1 2 3
CGOH90 -14.7% -4.4% -1.2% 1.5% 4.6% 9.8% Total
Median 0.552 0.720 0.776 0.819 0.870 0.909 0.798
Mean 0.508*** 0.685*** 0.760*** 0.803*** 0.843*** 0.861*** 0.759***
t-stat
(PDR=1)
-12.47 -9.44 -7.81 -7.83 -5.86 -4.47 -19.21
Obs 3,567 3,567 3,568 4,976 4,975 4,975 25,628
Panel C: Ex-day opening prices; ARex per
CGOH90 Quantile
CGOH90 Quantile
Losers Winners
Quantile 3 2 1 1 2 3
CGOH90 -13.3% -4.3% -1.2% 1.5% 4.6% 9.9% Total
Median 0.289% 0.157% 0.128% 0.106% 0.073% 0.042% 0.114%
Mean 0.288%*** 0.186%*** 0.153%*** 0.126%*** 0.101%*** 0.085%*** 0.147%***
t-stat
(ARex=0)
21.43 16.46 14.54 14.80 11.97 9.14 35.77
Obs 3,500 3,500 3,501 5,043 5,042 5,042 25,628
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Table 8
Relationship between PDR/ARex and CGOH for the whole sample and separately
for winners or losers, using opening prices on the ex-day.
Both PDR and ARex are computed as described in Graham et al. (2003) using opening prices on the ex-
day. This table reports the estimated coefficients and their t-statistics of the pooled regressions of
PDR/ARex of the 2.5% trimmed samples against CGOH and a group of control variables as:
PDRi / ARiex = α + β1CGOHi + β2DYi + β3MCapi + β4TOi + β5IVoli + β5Tax03i + εi
where CGOHi is the capital gains overhang of stock i for an assumed investor holding period of 90
calendar days. DYi is the dividend yield equal to the dividend amount over the closing price on the
cum-day. MCapi is the mean stock relative size equal to the average natural log (individual stock
capitalization to market capitalization) over the estimation window. TOi is the average stock turnover
over the estimation window. IVoli measures the idiosyncratic volatility as the ratio of (individual stock
standard deviation to market standard deviation) of daily returns over the estimation window. Tax03i is
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ex-day is located after the May 22, 2003 Tax Act and
0 otherwise. The weighted least squares method (WLS) is utilized for the PDR regression with the
weight being equal to the squared ratio of (DY to stock return standard deviation over the estimation
window). The ARex regression estimated with the ordinary least squares (OLS) method reports t-
statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity (White (1980)). Both PDR and ARex are computed as
described in Section 3.2 using opening prices on the ex-day. The estimation window is [(130, 31) &
(+31, +130)] trade days around the ex-day and the CRSP equal weight NYSE/AMEX index is
employed as a proxy for the market portfolio. The CGOH is defined as the percentage deviation of the
closing trade price on the cum-day from the aggregate cost basis proxy over an assumed holding period
of 90 calendar days that is computed as in Grinblatt and Han (2005) using daily price and turnover
data, and described in Section 3.5. The number in parentheses below the coefficient is the t-statistic.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
PDR (WLS) ARex (OLS)
Var./Sample All stocks Winners Losers All stocks Winners Losers
Intercept 0.7098*** 0.8297*** 0.5151*** 0.0014*** 0.0007** 0.0022***
(12.96) (11.77) (5.91) (5.68) (2.34) (5.61)
CGOH90 0.7643*** 1.0929*** 0.1173 -0.0074*** -0.0042*** -0.0072***
(6.51) (3.09) (0.64) (-11.35) (-2.90) (-5.40)
DY 0.6544* 0.5634 0.7595 0.0362*** 0.0401*** 0.0332**
(1.86) (1.06) (1.59) (3.66) (2.92) (2.44)
Mcap -0.0050 0.0095 -0.0218** 0.0000 -0.0001** 0.0000
(-0.79) (1.18) (-2.15) (-1.23) (-2.36) (0.94)
TO -0.0637*** -0.0647*** -0.0694*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0002**
(-4.72) (-3.70) (-3.25) (4.83) (4.18) (2.43)
IVol -0.0248** -0.0156 -0.0427** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(-2.16) (-1.00) (-2.39) (-1.55) (-1.53) (-1.10)
Tax03 -0.0103 -0.0137 -0.0085 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
(-0.43) (-0.46) (-0.22) (0.94) (1.35) (0.31)
Adj. R2 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.014 0.006 0.010
F-stat 16.96 4.65 6.91 30.55 7.23 8.53
Obs 25,628 14,926 10,702 25,628 15,127 10,501
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Table 9
Abnormal trading pressure around the ex-day.
Using the ARex 2.5% trimmed sample of ex-days, we separately split winning/losing stocks, with a
positive/negative CGOH over a 90-calendar day window, into three quantiles on the basis of the value
of their [20, 1] cumulative abnormal return (CAR[20, 1]). Winners in the highest CAR[20, 1] quantile
are assumed to bear the highest abnormal buying pressure and losers in the lowest CAR[20, 1] quantile
are assumed to bear the highest abnormal selling pressure before the ex-day. Panel A reports daily and
cumulative abnormal returns (AR and CAR), and daily and cumulative abnormal turnovers (ATO and
CATO), for a window of [20, +20] trading days around the ex-day of winners with the highest upward
pressure prior the ex-day. Panel B reports daily and cumulative abnormal returns (AR and CAR), and
daily and cumulative abnormal turnovers (ATO and CATO), for a window of [20, +20] trading days
around the ex-day of losers with the highest downward pressure prior the ex-day. Abnormal return
before or after the ex-day is calculated as the percentage deviation of daily closing prices adjusted for
the market movement using the market model that is estimated over the [(130, 31) & (+31, +130)]
days window around the ex-day with the CRSP equal weight NYSE/AMEX index as the market proxy.
The abnormal return on the ex-day (ARex) includes the dividend as illustrated in Section 3.2. Abnormal
turnover is calculated according to the Campbell and Wasley (1996) methodology described in Section
3.4. T-statistics test whether daily or cumulative AR or ATO is significantly different to zero on each
day. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Winners in the top CAR[-20, -1] quantile (Obs. 5,038)
AR CAR ATO CATO
Day mean t-stat mean t-stat mean t-stat mean t-stat
-20 0.51%*** 16.51 0.51%*** 16.51 0.91% 0.97 0.91% 0.97
-15 0.54%*** 17.62 3.18%*** 43.56 3.37%*** 3.62 14.69%*** 4.00
-10 0.59%*** 18.27 6.06%*** 68.53 8.74%*** 9.24 49.38% 8.36
-5 0.56%*** 16.80 8.87%*** 94.54 11.28%*** 12.44 102.06%*** 13.06
-4 0.47%*** 13.96 9.35%*** 99.08 10.46%*** 11.29 112.52%*** 13.81
-3 0.55%*** 17.06 9.89%*** 105.02 10.90%*** 12.06 123.43%*** 14.55
-2 0.55%*** 17.17 10.45%*** 111.08 11.46%*** 12.89 134.89%*** 15.29
-1 0.57%*** 19.59 11.02%*** 117.79 11.83%*** 13.05 146.72%*** 15.96
Ex-Div 0.14%*** 6.92 11.16%*** 116.86 6.19%*** 7.10 152.91%*** 15.97
+1 0.01% 0.24 11.16%*** 112.98 3.46%*** 3.98 156.37%*** 15.76
+2 0.02% 0.93 11.19%*** 108.31 3.26%*** 3.69 159.92%*** 15.55
+3 0.07%*** 2.68 11.26%*** 105.11 2.72%*** 3.08 162.81%*** 15.25
+4 0.07%*** 2.51 11.33%*** 102.91 1.95%** 2.21 164.85%*** 14.91
+5 0.03% 1.31 11.36%*** 99.63 1.89%** 2.06 166.74%*** 14.57
+10 0.06%** 1.97 11.51%*** 88.86 1.07% 1.21 175.38%*** 13.22
+15 0.00% -0.09 11.73%*** 80.67 -0.12% -0.13 177.07%*** 11.86
+20 0.04% 1.52 11.92%*** 73.90 -1.46% -1.58 171.97%*** 10.43
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Panel B: Losers in the bottom CAR[-20, -1] quantile (Obs. 3,524)
AR CAR ATO CATO
Day mean t-stat mean t-stat mean t-stat mean t-stat
-20 -0.63%*** -15.84 -0.63%*** -15.84 -1.60% -1.44 -1.60% -1.44
-15 -0.68%*** -16.51 -3.52%*** -41.04 4.06%*** 3.42 5.86% 1.36
-10 -0.68%*** -16.86 -6.67%*** -63.72 8.71%*** 7.38 39.02%*** 5.59
-5 -0.64%*** -15.33 -9.85%*** -87.91 12.21%*** 10.78 94.70%*** 10.08
-4 -0.62%*** -15.77 -10.47%*** -91.52 10.36%*** 8.95 105.07%*** 10.65
-3 -0.59%*** -15.69 -11.06%*** -97.26 10.43%*** 9.15 115.49%*** 11.22
-2 -0.58%*** -16.21 -11.64%*** -103.12 11.29%*** 10.29 126.79%*** 11.82
-1 -0.55% -14.47 -12.18%*** -109.92 11.52%*** 10.22 138.31%*** 12.38
Ex-Div 0.18%*** 7.27 -12.00%*** -105.90 8.92%*** 8.44 147.23%*** 12.73
+1 -0.01% -0.14 -12.00%*** -101.45 6.66%*** 6.22 153.99%*** 12.86
+2 -0.13%*** -3.43 -12.12%*** -95.84 7.82%*** 7.22 162.38%*** 13.12
+3 -0.01% -0.21 -12.12%*** -91.78 6.30%*** 6.17 169.18%*** 13.23
+4 -0.01% -0.34 -12.14%*** -88.68 5.64%*** 5.16 174.82%*** 13.19
+5 -0.01% -0.29 -12.14%*** -86.79 6.98%*** 6.51 181.79%*** 13.28
+10 -0.03% -0.71 -12.33%*** -74.74 4.69%*** 4.20 210.83%*** 13.41
+15 -0.09%** -2.42 -12.53%*** -67.52 4.03%*** 3.67 235.37%*** 13.31
+20 -0.06% -1.45 -12.87%*** -62.43 3.31%*** 3.03 257.27%*** 13.23
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Table 10
Difference of mean and median ARex between highest and lowest abnormal
trading pressure separately for winners and losers.
Using the ARex 2.5% trimmed sample of ex-days, we separately split winning/losing stocks, with a
positive/negative CGOH over a 90-calendar day window, into three quantiles on the basis of the value
of their [20, 1] cumulative abnormal return (CAR[20, 1]). Winners in the highest (lowest) CAR[20, 1]
quantile are assumed to bear the highest (lowest) abnormal buying pressure. In the same manner, losers
in the lowest (highest) CAR[20, 1] quantile are assumed to bear the highest (lowest) abnormal selling
pressure before the ex-day. The left part of the table reports tests on the difference of mean and median
ARex between the highest and lowest abnormal buying pressure samples of winners. The right part of
the table reports tests on the difference of mean and median ARex between the highest and lowest
abnormal selling pressure samples of losers. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used for testing the
difference of median values. ***, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, and 10% level,
respectively, using a two-tail test.
Winners(CGOH90) Obs Mean Median Losers (CGOH90) Obs Mean Median
Highest CAR[20, 1] 5,038 0.135% 0.114% Lowest CAR[20, 1] 3,524 0.181% 0.176%
Lowest CAR[20, 1] 5,039 0.002% -0.018% Highest CAR[20, 1] 3,523 0.231% 0.228%
Diff. 0.133%*** 0.132%*** Diff. -0.050% -0.052%*
t-stat / z-stat 5.16 5.10 t-stat / z-stat -1.46 -1.76
